Much has been written about the disagreement and even radical opposition between Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s conceptualizations and those of Jacques Lacan: for example, about desire, psychotherapy, the subject and the radically opposed political consequences that result from their approaches. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate from a Lacanian perspective that in the case of a central concept such as the body, there are rather more similarities than differences. Its main thesis is that Deleuze’s and Guattari’s body (...) without organs is very close to Lacan’s notion of the Other jouissance and that with slightly different strategies they both provide arguments to fight the same enemy: that is, the control and repression of singularity under capitalism. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Jacques Lacan introduce en su seminario XX Aún una distinción entre dos tipos de goce [jouissance]: un goce fálico o sexual propiamente masculino, y en el caso de la posición femenina, y complementario del anterior, un goce Otro o goce del cuerpo absolutamente particular de cada mujer. Deleuze y Guattari piensan la feminidad en Mil mesetas como un devenir-mujer consistente en la construcción de un "cuerpo sin órganos" singular y propio más allá del organismo que resulta de disciplinar familiar (...) y socialmente este cuerpo. Este estudio pretende demostrar la convergencia de ambas propuestas al pensar la feminidad como una vivencia singular del propio cuerpo. ABSTRACT: Jacques Lacan distinguishes in his seminar XX Still between two types of jouissance: a phallic and male sexual jouissance, and in the case of the women, an absolutely particular Other jouissance of the body of each subject. Deleuze and Guattari think femininity in A Thousand Plateaus as a becoming-woman involving the construction of a "body without organs" unique and singular beyond the familiarly and socially disciplined body. This study aims to demonstrate the fundamental coincidence of both proposals when thinking femininity as a particular experience of the own body. (shrink)

ResumenEste estudio ofrece una presentación del trabajo de investigación desarrollado en una tesis doctoral sobre el problema de la conciencia del tiempo en la fenomenología de Husserl defendida en la Universidad de Barcelona en abril del 2007. Tras justificar la importancia que el tema tiene para el pensamiento de Husserl son presentados los diferentes acercamientos a esta cuestión en cada una de las épocas de su pensamiento, distinguiendo fundamentalmente tres periodos: las lecciones sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo (1904/05), los (...) manuscritos de Bernau (1917/18) y los manuscritos C (1929/34).Palabras claveFenomenología, tiempo, conciencia, Husserl.AbstractThis paper offers a general overview of a research developed and defended as a PhD at the University of Barcelona in April 2007 concerning the problem of time- consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology. After justifying the relevance of the subject to Husserl, we present the different approaches to the problem of time-consciousness in every period of his thinking, distinguishing mainly three phases: the lessons about inner time consciousness (1904/05), the Bernauer manuscripts (1917/18) and the C- manuscripts (1929/34).KeywordsPhenomenology, time, consciousness, Husserl. (shrink)

This paper tries to clarify the coincidence between some of the main features of the characterization of perception in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception) and the picture technique of Cézanne. Although placed in different work areas, indeed, the reflection about the perceptive act and the process of pictorical creation, there is an inspirational shared basis: Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “original experience” goes parallel to Cézanne’s understanding of the painting as a the original appearing of the things so as they (...) should appear to a glaze that goes beyond the objectivating categories of every daily, normal perception. (shrink)

In this article the author presents Husserl’s analysis of the problem of time-consciousness in the C-Manuscripts (1929-1934). He tries to discuss the reasons why Husserl introduces the concept of “living present” and the necessity of distinguishing the originary temporalizing flux of absolute consciousness and the immanent time where acts are placed when they become object of an act of reflection. Another important issue is the introduction of a Ur-Ich, which works anonymously and temporalizes itself. It will be also studied why (...) Husserl considers at the end that temporalization is an non-intentional passive process that works at the deepest level of consciousness. (shrink)